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Debtors sometimes mistakenly suppose that actions against
them will automatically abate if the debtors become bankrupt.
Three recent cases afford examples. In Breaux v. Boutin' a
defendant contended in the court of appeal that, as he had been
adjudicated bankrupt after the action began and as the judg-
ment in favor of plaintiffs in the court below could not be
executed, it followed that plaintiffs had stated no cause or
right of action against him. In Gumina v. Dupas,2 a discharged
bankrupt sued to annul a default judgment entered in an action
begun before bankruptcy. In Public Finance Corp. v. Vice,8
defendants in an action on a note filed peremptory exceptions
of no cause and no right of action on the ground that the debt
had been discharged in bankruptcy. In no instance did the debtor
prevail.
Each debtor might have applied to the bankruptcy court to
stay the pending action until a discharge in bankruptcy could
be obtained, 4 and ought thereafter to have pleaded the discharge
in the pending action. All evidently assumed not only that the
adjudication would operate, without more, to terminate the ac-
tion but also that the discharge would extinguish the debt. In
this they were mistaken. It is no part of a plaintiff's duty to
allege that the debt on which he sues has not been discharged;
rather, as article 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure5 explicitly
provides, discharge in bankruptcy is an affirmative defense. It
should be added, however, that a discharged bankrupt may still
prevent execution of a judgment based on a debt affected by the
discharge, provided only that the debt was properly scheduled
in the bankruptcy proceeding.6
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 182 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
2. 178 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
3. 177 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
4. See Bankruptcy Act § 11a, 11 U.S.C. § 29a (1964).
5. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1005 (1960).
6. See Bankruptcy Act § 17a(3), 11 U.S.C. § 35a(3) (1964).
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DEBTS EXCEPTED FROM DISCHARGE
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act lists five categories of
debts not affected by a discharge. Section 17a(2) provides in
part:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts, . . . except such as ... (2) are lia-
bilities for obtaining money or property by false pretences
or false representations, or for obtaining money or property
on credit, or obtaining the extension or renewal of credit in
reliance upon a materially false statement in writing respect-
ing his financial condition made or published or caused to be
made or published in any manner whatsoever with intent to
deceive .... ,,7
Where, after his debtor's bankruptcy, a creditor sues on a
claim properly scheduled in bankruptcy, and the debtor pleads
his discharge, the plaintiff, if he is to bring his claim within the
language quoted above, must be able to show: "(1) That defend-
ant made false representations; (2) that these representations
were made with the intention of defrauding the plaintiff, and
(3) that the plaintiff relied upon and was misled by the false
pretenses or representations."
8
Midland Discount Co. v. Robichaux9 was an action on a note
against a borrower who had submitted a false financial state-
ment in writing. The lender, however, knew that the borrower
had given false and incomplete information about his obliga-
tions, and this knowledge was held to preclude a finding of
reliance on the statement.
In Excel Fin. Camp v. Autin,10 defendant admitted making a
financial statement in which he represented that he owed only
one debt in an amount that was stated. Less than three months
after giving the note in suit, defendant filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy. Plaintiff's employee was allowed to testify, on informa-
tion derived from a newspaper account, about debts scheduled
by the bankrupt. Allowance of this testimony was erroneous
under the best evidence rule (as was admission of oral evidence
of defendant's discharge), and in any event without other proof
7. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(2) (1964).
8. DeLatour v. Lala, 15 La. App. 276, 278, 131 So. 211, 212 (Orl. Cir. 1930).
9. 184 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
10. 177 So. 2d 662 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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it failed to establish that debts owed at the date of bankruptcy
were likewise in existence when the financial statement was
made.
In Seaboard Fin. Corp. v. Stipelcovich" where the defendant
signed an assumed name to two notes, admittedly because he
was deeply in debt and in order to obtain credit, and the proof
showed that plaintiff was misled by use of the assumed name, a
default judgment on the notes was declared a non-dischargeable
debt.
Section 17a (2) further provides:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts, .. . except such as . . . (2) are
liabilities ... for willful and malicious injuries to the person
or property of another .. ."12
L. & M. Bldg. & Supply v. Soileau 3 was a garnishment pro-
ceeding in execution of judgment, where the judgment debtor
intervened to assert that the judgment was unenforceable by
reason of his subsequent bankruptcy. The plaintiff's petition
had alleged, however, and the judgment had recited, an inten-
tional conversion by defendant of plaintiff's funds. This finding
incorporated in the judgment was conclusive against the judg-
ment debtor and established a willful and malicious injury to
the property of another within the language of section 17a(2).
American Home Assur. Co. v. Coleman14 arose out of a high-
way collision caused apparently by defendant's minor son. The
son admitted that he had been drinking, and liability for injury
inflicted by a drunken driver is a non-dischargeable debt.15 De-
fendant had filed a petition in bankruptcy, scheduling the debt
that was owed as a result of the collision, and had received his
discharge. The question was whether the nature of the liability,
willful and malicious as to the son, could be attributed to the
father so as to except it from the discharge. The answer was no.
The case is unusual, but there seems little doubt that the father's
responsibility' for the negligence of his son is not an adequate
basis for imputing to the father the son's personal fault.
11. 176 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(2) (1964).
13. 176 So. 2d 756 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965),.
14. 180 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
15. LaFleur v. Fontenot, 120 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Rosen v.
Shingleur, 47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1950).
16. See LA. CvIVL CODE art. 2318 (1870).
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PROMISE To PAY DISCHARGED DEBT
Since Lord Mansfield's day it has been settled that a new
promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy is actionable. 7
The new promise, however, must be distinct and unequivocal
and the intention of the bankrupt to bind himself must be clear. 8
In Securities Fin. Co. v. Marbury19 the discharged debtor told
his creditor in one letter: "I am going to try and send you some-
thing each week," and in another letter asked that a payment
book be mailed, "showing bal. to be paid at $24.00 every other
week." It was held that as neither writing contained a clear,
distinct and unequivocal promise to pay the debt, the discharge
in bankruptcy was a good defense.
17. Truenan v. Fenton [1777], 2 Cowper 544.
18. See Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 21 So. 2d 485 (1945), which refers
to LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1757, 1759 (1870) and states, 207 La. 422, 434, 21 So. 2d
485, 488: "The law on this subject is the same in Louisiana as it is in the other
states."
19. 180 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
